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SPECIAL VERDICTS
SPECIAL VERDICTS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
ABNER EDDINS LIPSCOMBt
I. INTRODUCTION
Eight hundred years of experience with the system of trial by
jury have not served to develop the scientific fact-finding pro-
cedure to which the common law is entitled. Nor has this long
experience served to resolve successfully the struggle between
judge and jury for supremacy in the legal process. The problems
of designating and of protecting the appropriate functions of
these two companion agencies of justice still persist.' Of these
problems, the most vital to the life of the jury system are those
presented in the court's charge and the jury's verdict.
Traditionally the jury has functioned by rendering a general
verdict in response to a general charge. In the general charge
the trial judge hypothetically presents to the jury the law which
is applicable to the factual issues as raised by the pleadings and
the evidence. The charge divides the burden of proof between
the litigants, and thus emphasis is placed upon the adversary
nature of the procedure.2 After the jury has received instruc-
tions on the law appropriate to the case, it must perform the
three-fold task of understanding the law as thus presented in
the general charge, of determining the true facts from the
mass of conflicting testimony, and of correctly applying the law
as presented to the facts as found. After performing this diffi-
cult, three-fold task, the jury renders a simple, single conclusion
-the plaintiff or the defendant wins. Even aside from the un-
predictable elements of bias and prejudice, the jury's task under
the general charge is an unreasonable one. Professor Sunderland
has ably characterized the task of the jury under the general
charge thus:
t A.B., Baylor University, 1925; LL.B., 1925; LL.B., University of
Texas, 1934; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1938. Professor of Law, Baylor
University, on leave of absence. Senior Attorney, Federal Trade Commis-
sion.
1. See: Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 605; Morgan,
Function of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions
of Fact (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
c. 16-26.
2. Professor Morgan has asserted: "Two elements conspire to prevent
an ordinary lawsuit from being a rational proceeding for the ascertainment
of truth-jury trial and the adversary theory of litigation." Hearsay and
Non-hearsay (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1138.
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The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merging into
a single individual residuum of all matters, however numer-
ous, whether of law or fact. It is a compound made by thejury which is incapable of being broken up into its constitu-
ent parts. No judicial reagents exist for either a qualitative
or a quantitative analysis * * *. There are therefore three
unknown elements which enter into the general verdict:
(a) the facts; (b) the law; (c) the application of the law
to the facts. And it is clear that the verdict is liable to three
sources of error, corresponding to these three elements.
It is also clear that if error does occur in any of these mat-
ters it cannot be discovered, for the constituents of the
compound" cannot be ascertained. No one but the jury can
tell what was put into it and the jurors will not be heard to
say.$
He has also suggested that the general verdict is valued not for
what it is but for what it does-for concealing the procedural
errors of the jury and for giving us the assurance that we have
attained the unattainable.
The first efforts to relieve the jury from the unreasonable
requirements of the general verdict were made early in the
development of the jury system. As a result of those efforts the
first substitute for the general verdict was offered in the form
of a special verdict.4 An inquiry into its origin is of interest.
The jury of early English history was accorded a place of exalted
importance in contrast to the place of minor importance held
by the trial judge. Indeed, there seems to have been a tendency
during its formative period to accord to the jury's verdict the
same supernatural finality as had been previously accorded de-
cisions by ordeal, by battle, and by wager of law. Not only did
the jury have the power of determining the facts in controversy,
but it also had the authority to determine and to apply the law
as well., To the court room it brought both its information as
to the facts and its understanding of the law. (Indeed, this pre-
3. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 253,
258. In Mlounger v. Wells (C. C. A. 5, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 521, 522, the court
in criticizing the special verdict for its inconsistencies asserted: "It would
have been simpler and more conclusive to have left the whole case to thejury for a general verdict."
4. Clementson, Special Verdicts (1903) c. 1; Morgan, A Brief History of
Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 575, 588;
Green, A New Development in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 715.
5. See: 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1922) 312 et seq.;
Thayer, The Jury and its Development (1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 249; Thayer,
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) c. 2-4; Morgan, supra note 3.
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rogative of the jury to determine the appropriate law persisted
long after the judge had gained the right to control the admis-
sibility of all evidence.) 6 The ancient jury, however, despite its
broad powers and prerogatives in the trial process, was at an
early date subjected to the peril of the attaint. If, upon an appeal
to the grand jury, the trial jury's verdict was found to be false,
whether in law or in fact, the jury was subjected to severe pun-
ishment.7 In order to relieve the jury from this constant peril the
English Parliament provided by the Statute of Westminster II:
6. In State of Georgia v. Brailsford (U. S. 1794) 3 Dall. 1, 4, Chief
Justice Jay, in charging the jury, stated:
"It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on ques-
tions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be
observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable dis-
tribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the
fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however,
we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the
opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, thatjuries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presum-
able, that the courts are the best judges of law. But still both objects
are lawfully within your power of decision." (Italics supplied.)
One hundred years later the power of the jury to pass upon the law of the
case was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Sparf and
Handen v. United States (1894) 156 U. S. 51, but Justice Gray, with whom
concurred Justice Shiras, wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion concluding
that the case should be reversed because, " * * the defendants, by the in-
struction given by the court to the jury, have been deprived, both of their
right to have the jury decide the law involved in the general issue, and also
of their right to have the jury decide every matter of fact involved in that
issue." 156 U. S. at 182. It should be observed that the learned jurist was
dealing with a criminal case in which the issues are more political than
they are in private litigation. See: Sunderland, supra note 3.
7. Sir William Blackstone gives us this interesting statement in regard
to attaint juries: "The jury who are called to try this false verdict must
be twenty-four, and are called the grand jury; for the law wills not that
the oath of one jury of twelve should be attainted or set aside by an equal
number, nor by less indeed than double the former * * *. And he that
brings the attaint can give no other evidence to the grand jury, than what
was originally given to the petit. For as their verdict is now trying, and
the question is, whether or no they did right upon the evidence that ap-
peared to them, the law adjudged it the highest absurdity to produce any
subsequent proof upon such trial, and to condemn the prior jurisdiction for
not believing evidence which they never knew. But those against whom it
is brought are allowed, in affirmance of the first verdict, to produce new
matter; because the petit jury may have formed their verdict upon evi-
dence of their own knowledge, which never appeared in court. If the grand
jury found the verdict a false one, the judgment by the common law was,
that the jurors should lose their liberam legem and become forever in-
famous; should forfeit their goods and the profits of their lands; should
themselves be imprisoned, and their wives and children thrown out of
doors; should have their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their
19401
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The justices assigned to take assizes shall not compel thejurors to say precisely whether it be disseisin, or not, so
that they do show the truth of the deed, and require aid of
the justices. But if they of their own head would say that
it is disseisin, their verdict shall be admitted at their own
peril.8
The special verdict which developed under this statute consisted
of lengthy recitals of the facts in contrast to the modern special
verdict, which generally consists of brief or categorial answers
to interrogatories propounded to the jury. Although the perils
of the attaint have long since disappeared, 9 the use of the special
verdict has remained a part of English trial procedure. At times
it has been variously used both in civil and in criminal cases,10
but under the new order in England the practice of receiving
verdicts from the jury in response to specific interrogatories
directed to it by the judge is well established.'
Along with the development of the special verdict, there
evolved in England the practice of quizzing the jury both in con-
nection with its special verdicts and in connection with its
general verdicts.22 It appears, however, that the English jury
has resisted such inquiries into the residuum of its verdict and
that the English court in deference to the wishes of the jury
has returned to the ancient practice of according to the jury
the privilege of rendering at its own discretion and without
quizzing thereon a special or a general verdict.13 In the United
States, however, the practice of testing the jury, especially in
cases in which the judge was surprised at its general verdict,
was early developed in Massachusetts and in other New England
States." As this practice has developed it is broadly different
from the practice of the special verdict. Whereas the special
meadows ploughed; and that the plaintiff should be restored to all that
he lost by reason of the unjust verdict." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *404.
See infra, note 9, for abolishment of the Writ of Attaint.
8. (1285) Statute of Westminster II, c. 30. This statute has been held
to be declaratory of the common law. See supra note 3.
9. The Writ of Attaint was abolished by (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, see. 60.
10. See: Morgan, supra note 4.
11. Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937) 50
Harv. L. Rev. 1017; Millar, The Old Regime and the New Civil Procedure
(1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1, 214.
12. See: Wicher, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases (1926)
35 Yale L. J. 296; Clementson, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 2 and 3.
13. See supra, note 12.
14. See supra, note 12.
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verdict is in lieu of a general verdict and is designed to exhibit
all the ultimate facts and to leave the drawing of legal conclu-
sions to the judge, interrogatories accompanying the general
verdict are designed merely to test it on one or more vital issues.
The practice of using interrogatories met with such favor that
it was soon extended so as to allow special interrogatories to
be propounded to the jury along with the general charge, the
answers to accompany the general verdict. A majority of the
states have adopted substantially this practice. 5
Although the practice of quizzing the jury upon its general
verdict has the advantage of determining how well the jury has
resolved its fact-finding and administrative functions, it does not
eliminate from the trial the chief objectionable features of the
general charge. At best it is only an improvement on the general
charge and certainly is not a substitute for it. This method of
submitting interrogatories to the jury along with a general
charge has been incorporated in the new rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Court of the United States as Rule 49 (b).16 It
should not be confused with the special verdict provision of
Rule 49 (a).7
15. See supra, note 12.
16. "Rule 49. SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES. (b)
General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The court may
submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers
to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall
direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general
verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the
court shall direct the entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict
and answers. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or
more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the
entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the
general verdict or may return the jury for further consideration of its
answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are in-
consistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with
the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but
may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial."
17. "Rule 49. SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES. (a)
Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact.
In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible
of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the
several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings
and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and
requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The
1940]
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In the United States efforts to develop a worthy and scientific
substitute for the general charge have evolved modified versions
of the common law special verdict in several states.18 Of these
states, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Texas have made the
most serious efforts to improve the jury trial. The North Caro-
lina practice is unique. Although the North Carolina statute
defines its modernized verdict as a "special verdict * * * by which
the jury find the facts only,"'19 its practice is far removed from
the common law predecessor.20 By statutory mandate only a
few issues are submitted to the jury, and such issues are gener-
ally formulated by the attorneys or by the judge before the in-
troduction of testimony.21 Dean Green has asserted that this
practice has enabled a very small judiciary to care for the liti-
gation of one of our larger states.22 The practice does have the
distinct advantages of apparent simplicity and efficiency, yet it
is very different from the conventional concept of a special
verdict.
The Wisconsin practice as early as 1876 had made distinct
court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning
the matter thus submitted as may' be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of
fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right
to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such
demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special
verdict."
18. Green, supra note 4. Donley, Trial By Jury in Civil Cases (1929)
13 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 16; Staton, The Special Verdict As An Aid to the
Jury (1929) 13 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 176; Millar, supra note 11.
19. N. C. Code Ann. (1935) see. 585.
20. "The statute does not contemplate or require that an issue shall be
submitted as to every important material fact controverted by the pleadings,
nor is it necessary, expedient, or proper to do so." Patton v. Western N. C.
R. R. (1887) 96 N. C. 455, 464, 1 S. E. 863. It appears that it is not error
to combine in one issue the question of whether a plaintiff has ben injured
and has sustained damages through the negligence of a defendant, even
though contributory negligence is set up as a defense and there is evidence
of contributory negligence in the record. McAdoo v. Richmond & Danville
R. R. (1890) 105 N. C. 140, 11 S. E. 316. See also Boyer v. Teague (1890)
106 N. C. 576, 633, 11 S. E. 665; Antietam Paper Co. v. Chronicle Pub. Co.
(1894) 115 N. C. 147, 20 S. E. 367; Witsell v. West Ashville & S. S. Ry.
(1897) 120 N. C. 557, 27 S. E. 125; Tuttle v. Tuttle (1907) 146 N. C. 484,
59 S. E. 1008; Shannonhouse v. White (1915) 171 N. C. 16, 86 S. E. 168;
Wallace v. Bellamy (1930) 199 N. C. 759, 155 S. E. 856; Grier v. Weldon
(1934) 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E. 200; Etheridge v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
(1934) 206 N. C. 657, 175 S. E. 124.
21. N. C. Code Ann. (1935) sec. 584. Beasley v. Surles (1906) 140 N. C.
605, 53 S. E. 360.
22. See Green, supra note 4.
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improvements in the common law special verdict, 3 and more
recent improvements have materially advanced its usefulness. 24
The Texas practice, distinctively styled the "special issue prac-
tice," approaches theoretical perfection, but its theoretical nice-
ties frequently lead to confusion and often tend to reduce the
efficiency of the system.25 Nevertheless, the modified Texas and
Wisconsin special verdicts are worthy advancements in the pro-
cedure of trial by jury.26 In 1897, Texas effected the most mate-
rial improvement which has been embodied in the modern special
verdict practice by providing that an omitted finding, in the
absence of a request therefor, should be deemed to have been
found by the court, provided that there was evidence in the
record to sustain the judgment.2 7 Ten years later Wisconsin
adopted a similar provision.2 8 In 1931, Michigan adopted a like
provision ;29 and recently the improvement of 1897, as well as
other statutory modifications, have found expression in the new
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Court of the United
States, wherein both a modified special verdict and interroga-
tories accompanying the general verdict are provided for.30
It may be interesting, therefore, to analyze the provisions of the
new federal rule in the light of the decisions of the federal and
states' courts, examining particularly the practices of the courts
of Wisconsin and Texas.
II. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The first provision of Rule 49 (a) stipulates that "the court
may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form
23. McNarra v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1876) 41 Wis. 69; Williams v.
Porter (1877) 41 Wis. 422; Hutchinson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1877)
41 Wis. 541; Ward v. Busack (1879) 46 Wis. 407, 1 N. W. 107.
24. Wis. Laws of 1907, sec. 2858, now incorporated in Wis. Stats. (1937)
sec. 270.27, 270.28.
25. Justice Lattimore asserted in Texas Elec. Service Co. v. Anderson.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 142, 145: "The law authorizing special
verdicts was enacted to obviate prejudice and emotional verdicts by re-
quiring the jury to find the ultimate facts at issue. Its value was at once
recognized so that now almost all jury verdicts in civil cases are on special
issues. Of late, a trend appears in the appellate courts to multiply and
increase the issues which a jury must pass on until it takes a Philadelphia
lawyer on the jury to furnish a verdict that will answer the requirements."
26. See supra, note 18.
27. Texas Laws of 1897, Special Sess., c. 7, now incorporated in Tex.
Vernon's Stats. (1936) secs. 2189, 2190.
28. See supra, note 24.
29. Mich. Court Rules 1931, 1933, Rule 37, sec. 7.
30. See supra, notes 16 and 17.
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of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." Thus it
appears that the privilege of calling for a special verdict is not
a right to be demanded by the parties but is rather a matter to
be determined by judicial discretion.31 This provision of the
rule is opposed to the common law rule which, as previously
observed, placed the control of this matter in the hands of the
jury. It is also opposed to the practice in Rhode Island, 3 Ohio, 3
Wisconsin34 and Texas,3 5 where special verdicts must be rendered
if requested by either party or if directed by the judge. Prior to
the enactment of the compulsory submission feature of the Texas
statute, the number of cases tried under the special issue practice
was negligible; but since its enactment in 1913, the special ver-
dict is used in practically every trial. It should be observed that
the statutory law of two states expressly provides that the special
verdict shall be rendered at the option of the jury,36 while the
statutory provisions of seven states are silent on the point.37
Six states provide for either a general or a special verdict at the
option of the jury in cases for the recovery of money only or of
31. Hammon, Edward H., speaking before the Judicial Conference of the
Fourth Circuit on June 11, 1937, asserted: " * * the court can now order a
special verdict in any case without the consent of the parties." This address
was published: Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 629, 633.
Prior to the new rule the special verdict was considered neither pleading
nor procedure, and the federal courts were not required to follow the prac-
tice of the various states. Indianapolis and St. Louis R. R. v. Horst (1876)
93 U. S. 291; United States Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry (1889) 131
U. S. 100; Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Malcolm (1896) 164 U. S. 483; Spokane
& Inland Empire R. R. v. Campbell (1916) 241 U. S. 497.
32. R. I. Laws of 1938, c. 534, sec. 2.
33. Ohio Page's Gen. Code Ann. (1926) see. 11460.
34. Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 270.27.
35. Tex. Laws of 1913, art. 1984a, now Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art.
2189. The statute provides: "* * * If the nature of the suit is such that it
cannot be determined on the submission of special issues, the court may
refuse the request to do so, but the action of the court in refusing may be
reviewed on proper exception in the appellate court."
No case has been found in which it is held that special issues could not
be employed, but the courts apparently recognize that there may be such a
situation. Comment (1939) 17 Tex. L. Rev. 521; Texas & N. 0. R. R. v.
Crow (Tex. Com. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d) 649; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
Rockwall County Levee Improvement Dist. (1927) 117 Tex. 34, 297 S. W.
206.
36. Ark. Dig. Stats. (1937) see. 1528; Johnson v. Missouri Pac. R. R.
(1921) 149 Ark. 418, 233 S. W. 699; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) see. 5658.
37. See: Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) sec. 3828; Iowa Code (1935) c. 496, sec.
11512; Me. Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 96, sec. 106; Mo. Stats. Ann. (1932) sec.
968; N. C. Code Ann. (1935) see. 585; Okla. Stats. Ann. (1936) tit. 12,
sec. 587; Vt. Public Laws (1933) sec. 1688.
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specific real property. 8 In other types of actions these six states
are in accord with the federal rules. On the other hand, one state
has expressly repealed the right of the jury to render any but
a general verdict.3 9 It is to be hoped that this limitation upon
the use of the special verdict under Rule 49 (a) will not retard
its use and development in the federal courts.
III. ISSUES OF FACT
The second provision of Rule 49 (a) calls for "a written find-
ing for each issue of fact." This language is similar to the lan-
guage used in the statutes of a number of states, particularly of
Wisconsin'0 and of Texas, 41 where its interpretation has occa-
sioned considerable difficulty. Obviously, the simplest cases may
involve many issues of fact; and, if an individual finding is re-
quired on each one, the special verdict becomes unwieldly. The
courts have, therefore, sought to limit the fact issues submitted
to "ultimate fact issues" in contradistinction to "evidentiary fact
issues.' 2 The difference between the two types of issues is
38. See: Cal. Deering Civil Proc. and Probate Codes (1937) sec. 625;
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) sec. 7-220; Neb. Rev. Code (1935) sec. 20-1121;
Ore. Code Ann. (1930) vol. 1, sec. 2-403; S. C. Code (1932) vol. 1, c. 31,
sec. 602; Wash. Remington's Rev. Stats. Ann. (1932) tit. 3, c. 3, sec. 364.
39. Ind. Burns Stats. Ann. (1933) sec. 2-2021. Ind. Laws of 1881, c. 38,
sec. 388, provides for special verdicts but Ind. Laws of 1897, c. 85, see. 1,
p. 128, abolishes its use.
40. Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 270.27 provides: **** Such verdict shall be
prepared by the court in the form of written question, relating only to
material issues of fact." This provision of the Wisconsin code is copied in
the Michigan Court Rules. See Searl, Mich. Ct. Rules Ann. (1933) sec. 7.
41. Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 2190, provides that the court shall
"submit all the issues made by the pleading and evidence."
42. In Baxter v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1899) 104 Wis. 307, 312, 80 N. W.
644, Marshall, J., asserted: "A failure to distinguish between such facts(material issue of fact raised by the pleading) and the numerous eviden-
tiary circumstances which may be the subjects of controversy on the evi-
dence and are relied upon to establish the ultimate facts upon which the
case turns, often leads to unjust criticism of a special verdict. * * * The
object of a special verdict is solely to obtain a decision of issues of fact
raised by the pleadings, not to decide disputes between witnesses as to minor
facts, even if such minor facts are essential to and establish, by inference
or otherwise, the main fact. * * * A strict compliance with this rule re-
quires that the verdict be made up of sufficient questions to at least cover,
singly, every fact in issue under the pleadings. If that could always be kept
in view, the legitimate purpose of such a verdict in promoting the adminis-
tration of justice would be uniformly accomplished, and the opinion enter-
tained by some that its use is harmful would cease to exist."
In Texas City Transp. Co. v. Winters (Tex. Com. App. 1920) 222 S. W.
541, 542, McClendon, J., asserted: "By the expression 'issues of fact' is not
meant the various controverted specific facts * * *, but only the independent
ultimate facts which go to make up the plaintiff's cause of action and de-
19401
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clearly one of degree only, and the submission of an ultimate
fact issue simply means that the interrogatories or form find-
ings submitted to the jury shall not include special inquiry into,
or statements of, all the numerous issuable matters in evidence.
Necessarily, considerations of trial expendiency forbid such a
detailed inquiry. The detailed evidentiary facts will normally
be grouped in the minds of the jury as the basis of its answers
to the broader factual conclusions presented by the pleadings.
The interrogatories, therefore, are framed on the theory that
the jury will consider and answer in its own mind each eviden-
tiary issue, including the credibility of each witness, and will
group its detailed mental conclusions into a broad conclusion.
This conclusion, standing alone, will present a controlling fact
in the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's ground of
defense. An evidentiary issue may be characterized as a subsid-
iary or a supplemental issue, which may be presumed to have
been found by the jury in such a manner as to support its answer
to the various interrogatories. It is of course true that occasion-
ally one item of evidence presents a controlling issue. In such
a case the evidentiary character of the issue is merged into the
more significant character of an "ultimate fact issue," and as
such it should be submitted. Experience has shown that the
problem is not always as simple as it may appear.
Furthermore, in determining what is an issue of fact, we are
confronted with the old and annoying problem of distinguishing
law from fact, and although we have learned the futility of draw-
ing our distinctions too nicely, distinctions must be made.43 The
fendant's ground of defense." See: Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery
Inv. Co. (1919) 94 Ore. 349, 184 Pac. 487.
43. See Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 259,
260, for a discussion of law, facts, and evidence distinguished.
The ruling is repeatedly made that issues in a special verdict must be
confined to matters of fact, without embodying questions of law. Strahan v.
Haynes (1928) 33 Ariz. 128, 262 Pac. 995; Napa Valley Packing Co. v.
San Francisco Relief & Red Cross Funds (1911) 16 Cal. App. 461, 118 Pac.
469; Tomlin v. Hilyard (1867) 43 Ill. 300, 92 Am. Dec. 118; Tippecanoe
Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester (1913) 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E. 915, L. R. A.
1915E 721; McGuire v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. (1908) 138 Iowa 664, 116
N. W. 801, aff'd (1910) 219 U. S. 549; Martin v. Chanute (1911) 86 Kan.
26, 119 Pac. 377; Banner Tobacco Co. v. Jenison (1882) 48 Mich. 459, 12
N. W. 655; Socony Burner Corp. v. Gold (1929) 227 App. Div. 369, 237
N. Y. S. 552; Nygaard v. Northern Pac. Ry. (1920) 46 N. D. 1, 178
N. W. 961; Oklahoma City v. Page (1931) 153 Okla. 285, 6 P. (2d) 1033;
Archambeau v. Edmunson (1918) 87 Ore. 476, 171 Pac. 186; Texas & N. 0.
Ry. v. Thompson (Tex. Com. App. 1929) 12 S. W. (2d) 963; Runyan v.
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precedents in the field of the special verdict, like similar prece-
dents in the field of pleading, are neither consistent nor always
sensible.4 An issue of fact may be very simple, as the determi-
nation of the fact of death, or it may be very complex, as the
determination of negligence, proximate cause, or nuisance, undue
influence, waiver, et cetera. The more complex so-called facts are
the composite of the application of a legal standard, rule, or con-
cept to the simple, factual conclusions of conduct. If the process
of determining such composite facts is not too difficult to be per-
formed readily by the jury and does not involve the application
of law which is too involved, it should be permitted. The deter-
mining of the reasonableness of the issue and of the jury's ability
to resolve the issue should rest in the discretion of the court.4 5
One Texas decision is worthy of consideration in this connec-
tion. In Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.,'8 the wife of Fox brought a tort
action based upon negligence for the death of her husband. The
plaintiff sought to establish negligence in the failure of the de-
fendant to keep an elevator in repair. The elevator had jammed
while Fox was attempting to use it in his capacity as the night
watchman. While Fox was endeavoring to discover the particu-
Kanawka Water & Light Co. (1911) 68 W. Va. 609, 71 S. E. 259, 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 430; Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co. (1906) 129 Wis. 98, 108 N.
W. 48; Wallace v. Skinner (1907) 15 Wyo. 233, 88 Pac. 221.
44. See: In Watson v. Patrick (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 174 S. W. 632, 633,
the court held the question: "Was the defendant indebted to plaintiff in the
sum of $875 when said attachment was sued out?" to be error involving a
mixed question of law and fact. Whereas, in Devine v. United States
Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) 48 S. W. 585, the court held that a
finding that defendant was not a principal was not a conclusion of law.
In Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Dickey (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 246 S. W.
730, 731, 732, the court held that it was proper to refuse the following issue
as including both law and fact: "Did the defendant * * * agree with the
plaintiff * * * that it would insure his property" but proper to submit the
question, "Was the policy sued on herein procured by direction of Ragsdale,
or his clerk, Newsome, through fraud or deceit?" (Emphasis supplied)
45. Obviously, in the infinite variety of controversies incident to civil
litigation many difficulties arise in determining (1) what are the ultimate
fact issues, and (2) how best to frame them. The difficulties incident to
these two problems inhere in the general charge as well as in the special
issue method. The first problem lies at the very base of the litigation, and
involves a proper legal analysis of the controversy. The second is obviously
addressed largely to the discretion of the court, which should only be re-
viewed where prejudicial abuse is shown; the object being to so frame the
issues as to direct the jury's attention, in as clear, simple, and direct a
manner as possible, to the concrete fact questions they are called upon to
decide. Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Edwards (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32 S. W.
(2d) 921. See also Comment (1932) 10 Tex. L. Rev. 217.
46. (1922) 111 Tex. 461, 475, 240 S. W. 517.
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lar trouble with the elevator, it fell and caused his death. The
defendant pleaded that the injuries to Fox were proximately
caused by his contributory negligence in the following particu-
lars:
1. That Fox in order to look under the elevator needlessly
placed his body in a'position where he would be injured
if the elevator should descend;
2. That he failed to overcome the sticking by operating the
elevator up and down;
3. That when the elevator stopped he failed to lock it in
position;
4. That he went under the elevator without having locked
it; and
5. That in working under the elevator he failed to get
entirely in the pit. * * *
There was sufficient evidence in the record to raise the question
of fact as to each of the distinct grounds of contributory negli-
gence set out in the answer of the defendant in error. Over
proper objection the trial judge refused to submit separate inter-
rogatories covering each of the alleged grounds of contributory
negligence but submitted rather the question whether Fox was
"guilty of contributory negligence in his conduct in, around, or
about the elevator, or the shaft either prior to or at the time
he was injured." It was found that there was contributory negli-
gence, and upon the jury's special verdict finding negligence,
judgment was rendered against the defendant for $9,000.00.
Upon writ of error the Texas Supreme Court condemned the
refusal of the trial judge to submit separately the various issues
of contributory negligence, asserting as follows:
The statutes make it the duty of the court in trials by
jury; first, to submit all the controverted fact issues made by
the pleadings; second, to submit each issue distinctly and
separately, avoiding all intermingling; * * *
In submitting either negligence or contributory neg-
ligence, special issues should be restricted to specific acts of
negligence alleged or proven. It was no less improper to
submit the general question of Fox's contributory neg-
ligence, over objection, without regard to the specific acts
of negligence plead and supported by proof, than it would
have been to have submitted the general question of defen-
dant in error's negligence, without regard to the specific
acts of negligence set out in plaintiff in error's petition.
Thus it appears that the Texas court has concluded that an ulti-
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mate fact issue, within the meaning of its special issue statute,
is a question of inquiry as to the existence or non-existence of
a controlling fact which is essential to a single ground of defense.
Under such a test anyone of the five alleged acts of contributory
negligence might constitute a valid ground of defense, and the
five acts might therefore constitute five ultimate fact issues.
Similarly, the Wisconsin court has held that it is error to
ask omnibus question concerning the negligent cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. In Fontaine v. Fontaine, 7 the Wisconsin court
asserted:
The jury should have been called upon to answer whether
each element of negligence constituted the cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. The reason for this is apparent. Part
of the jury might have thought that speed was the cause,
others that the failure to maintain a lookout was the cause,
and still others that control and management of the car was
the cause. This form of verdict did not require ten jurors
to agree that any species of negligence was the cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.
On the other hand, the North Carolina practice appears to ap-
prove the intermingling of such issues as negligence and proxi-
mate cause. 8 Such a practice is probably too near to the general
verdict to be entirely desirable.
The first federal decision involving factual issues under Rule
49(a) was presented in Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Roach.49 The plaintiff, an automobile liability insurance com-
pany, subsequent to an automobile accident involving the assured,
sought to secure a declaratory judgment nullifying its insurance
liability. The undisputed facts revealed that when the policy
was issued the defendant breached three present and promissory
warranties by misstating: "(1) the address of the insured; (2)
47. (1931) 205 Wis. 570, 575, 238 N. W. 410. In Waters v. Markham
(1931) 204 Wis. 332, 342, 235 N. W. 797, Richards, J., said: "The court
submitted but a single question relating to proximate cause and a single
question relating to reasonable anticipation. Having submitted to the jury
the first question, which contained three separate subdivisions respecting
deceased's failure to exercise ordinary care * * *. The question relating to
proximate cause should have had three subdivisions, and the same is true
as to the question submitting reasonable anticipation."
48. Turner v. Lipe (1936) 210 N. C. 627, 188 S. E. 108, 109. On the
issue of negligence and proximate cause the following issue was held
proper: "1. Was the plaintiff injured and damaged by the negligence of the
defendant, as alleged in the complaint? Answer Yes."
49. (D. C. Md. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 852.
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the place where the automobile would be principally garaged
and (3) where it would be principally used." The only real con-
troversy, therefore, was whether the insurance comyany by its
conduct in investigating the accident and in negotiating with the
defendant had waived the previous breaches of the warranties.
The trial judge, after instructing the jury "as a matter of
law that there was a breach of the policy conditions which
avoided the policy at the option of the insurer, unless the breach
of the policy had been waived by the insurer after knowledge
thereof," and after explaining the Maryland law of waiver, sub-
mitted two questions to the jury. They were:
(1) Q. Do you or not find as a matter of fact that the in-
surance company waived the breach of the policy? (Answer
this in writing 'Yes' or 'No'.)
(2) Q. If your answer to the above is 'Yes' then answer
the following question. (When that is on what date) do
you find that the insurance company through its agents
knew of the breach of the policy?
Both questions were answered favorably to the assured, and
judgment was entered accordingly.
The insurance company's request for a third interrogatory
requiring the jury "to find specifically when the insurer's agent
first learned that the insured's automobile was principally ga-
raged at Timonium" was denied. (It appeared to be uncontro-
verted that the car was not garaged at Timonium.) This question
arises: Did the requested interrogatory call for a finding on an
issue of fact or a finding on an evidentiary issue?
The court apparently treated the issue as an evidentiary one
for it asserted that "the jury could not have failed to understand
that they were not justified in answering 'yes' to the interroga-
tory as to the waiver if they found the insured agents did not
know * * * of the breach of the policy * * * until on or about
August 15th." Certainly it appears that the answer to the re-
jected question was vital to the broader issue of waiver and that
its answer might have controlled the judgment. Furthermore,
the issue submitted on waiver called for the applying of a rather
complex legal concept to the facts of the case and the rendering
of a rather broad legal conclusion thereon. Moreover, the answer
to the question on waiver gave the court no concrete factual find-
ings, and the court was forced to indulge in a presumption that
facts had been found favorable to the conclusion rendered. It
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might have been more consistent with the purpose of the special
verdict to have framed several questions designed to have ascer-
tained the simpler facts as to whether the insurance company
had, with knowledge of the misstatements in policy, voluntarily
and intentionally relinquished a known right or power to deny
liability because of such misstatements.
On the other hand, it should be observed that the practice in
Texas and in Wisconsin, despite its theoretical advantage of pre-
senting separately each controlling factual issue, has occasionally
resulted in the submission of so many issues that the practice
has at times been burdensome. It might be desirable, therefore,
as a sacrifice to an expedient trial to permit the grouping into
one factual finding of all facts which arise from the same trans-
actions and which constitute single elements of a cause of action
such as negligence and proximate cause, or a single ground of
defense such as contributory negligence or even waiver, as in
the case above.
IV. QUESTIONS OF FORM
The third provision of Rule 49(a) stipulates that the court
in the submission of an issue of fact
may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of cate-
gorial or other brief answers or may submit written forms
of the several special findings which might properly be made
under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other
method of submitting the issues and requiring the return
findings thereon as it deems most appropriate.
Thus two different forms for the submission of issues of fact
are presented, and the court is left free to "use such other meth-
ods * * * as it deems most appropriate." The mere form of an
issue has not been considered important except as a means of de-
veloping a technique for the discovery of the true facts 0 The
abolition of the judge's common law right to comment on the evi-
dence"' has increased for the majority of the states the problem
50. See Green, supra note 4.
51. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2551, gives us this interesting
statement in criticism of the prevailing statutory prohibition against the
judge's common law right to comment upon the evidence:
"The latter rule (which obtains by Constitution or statute in almost
every State, but not in the Federal Courts) is an unforunate departure
from the orthodox common-law rule. It has done more than any other
one thing to impair the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument
of justice. Since it remains the law by grace of statute only, in most
States, it can and should be readily abolished. A new birth of long life
will then be open for the great beneficient institution of Trial by jury."
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as to the form in which the issue may be presented to the jury.
In Texas, a question which may be construed to be a comment
on the evidence is objectionable. 52 Since the federal courts have
retained their common law privilege of commenting on the evi-
dence, they are not confronted with the same problem in the
same degree as are the courts in many of the states; but they
are, of course, concerned with a fair presentation of the facts
to the jury. Obviously, a question should not assume the exist-
ence of a material fact in controversy5 3 nor the existence of a
material fact for which there is no evidence in proof.5 On the
other hand, it is proper to assume the existence of a fact when
the evidence is so conclusive that reasonable men could reach but
one conclusion. 55 Likewise, it is proper to assume the existence
of any matter clearly within the doctrine of judicial notice. 0
It is, of course, the proper function of the court to determine
when there is sufficient evidence to justify the submission of an
issue to the jury.
It is especially imperative in the submission of special issues
that each question be independent of the others, i. e., it should
be so framed as to avoid the assumption of any particular an-
swers to the other issues. This result is frequently accomplished
by the use of qualifying phraseology which clearly negatives the
assumption of the existence of a fact as proof of any particular
answer to other issues. 7
In order that the judge's charge to the jury may be equally
fair to all litigants, the Texas courts have insisted that each
party to the litigation shall be given the right to demand an
affirmative presentation of his theory of the case to the jury.
This rule is well settled and pertains equally to the general
52. Davidson v. Wallingford (1895) 88 Tex. 619, 32 S. W. 1030; South-
land Greyhound Lines v. Richards (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 77 S. W. (2d)
272; Schaff v. Scoggin (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 202 S. W. 758.
53. Johnson v. Hyltin (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 133 S. W. 293; Martin,
Wise & Fitzhugh v. Texas & Pac. Ry. (1894) 87 Tex. 117, 26 S. W. 1052;
International & G. N. R. R. v. Brice (1906) 100 Tex. 203, 97 S. W. 461.
54. Payne v. Harris (Tex. Corn. App. 1922) 241 S. W. 1008; Lyles v.
Myer (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 293 S. W. 295.
55. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach (D. C. Md. 1939) 25 F.
Supp. 852.
56. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2565 et seq.
57. For example: "If you have answered special issue number one in the
affirmative, do you find etc." or some similar qualification negativing the
existence of any evidenciary hypothesis: Stayton, Methods of Practice in
Texas Courts (1935) 270.
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charge and to the special verdict.58 In many cases the issue which
presents affirmatively the plaintiff's theory of his cause of action
may negate the defendant's theory of defense. Likewise, the
defendant's affirmative theory of defense may negate the possi-
bility of an affirmative answer to those issues presenting the
plaintiff's affirmative viewpoint. Obviously, this practice of
asking inconsistent questions may result in inconsistent answers
and in a verdict which cannot be sustained. On the other hand,
the practice causes the conflicting viewpoints of the contestants
to be equally and fairly called to the attention of the jury. The
practice, therefore, serves as a searching inquiry into the con-
troversial issues of a case.
A serious problem has, however, arisen in the Texas practice
when the defendant has sought to have the issues presenting his
theory of defense submitted when such issues have not been
affirmatively alleged in his pleadings. Under the plea of a gen-
eral denial, the defendant may of course introduce any evidence
in rebuttal which is an inferential "no" to the plaintiff's allega-
tions. Also, an affirmative defense to be relied on must be
pleaded. The Texas courts have held, however, that the defen-
dant, upon request, is entitled under the rebuttal theory of the
general denial to affirmative interrogatories presenting his view
of defense.59 The most outstanding illustration of this practice
is that of presenting an affirmative issue on the basis of evidence
which indicates an unavoidable accident, such defense not having
been affirmatively pleaded. 0 This same theory has been applied
in order to justify the submission of the affirmative of other
purely rebuttal issues in other types of cases.61
58. See supra note 45.
59. McElroy v. Dobbs (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 674, 676, holding:
"Appellee combats the assignment of error under the view that there was
no pleading upon which to invoke the submission of such special charge.
This view is not correct. Appellee alleged that he made a certain contract
with appellant to procure a purchaser and thereby earned his fee. Appellant
answered by general denial. This answer was sufficient to put in issue
every fact necessary to sustain or defeat the cause of action. There was
nothing in the petition calling for any special pleading by defendant, and
the general denial met every feature of the case alleged." Comment (1930)
8 Tex. L. Rev. 294.
60. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Washington (1901) 94 Tex. 510, 63
S. W. 534; National Cash Register Co. v. Rider (Tex. Com. App. 1930)
24 S. W. (2d) 28; Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Garrison (Tex. Corn. App.
1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 183.
61. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Washington (1901) 94 Te. 510, 63 S.
W. 534 (unavoidable accident); Ford v. Couch (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 16
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The affirmative presentation of such a negative defense has
been criticized on the theory that any evidence presented under
the general denial was only negative in nature, tending merely
to say "no" to the plaintiff's allegations and that therefore such
issues were evidentiary only and should not be submitted in an
affirmative form as an issue to the jury.62 Certainly, ff the par-
ticular defense has not been affirmatively pleaded, it does not
merit an affirmative presentation as a question or as an issue.
Complete justice may be accomplished by one affirmative issue
presenting the affirmative issue pleaded. Obviously, there cannot
be an affirmative finding on an issue of negligence if the injury
resulted from an unavoidable accident or from an act of God.
Despite the fact that this practice multiplies the issues, it has
become well established in Texas.
6 3
In an effort to guard the theory of special verdict practice and
to keep the jury as a purely fact-finding body whose function is
to determine facts without regard to the results to the litigants,
state courts have held it error for an interrogatory or for the
instruction to suggest to the jury the legal effect which would
result from the jury's answer.6 ' In the first written opinion
S. W. (2d) 869 (congenital condition existing from birth rather than
negligence of physician); Horton & Horton v. House (Tex. Com. App.
1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 984 (negligence of third person is proximate cause of
injury); Federal Surety Co. v. Jetton (Tex. Com. App. 1930) 29 S. W.
(2d) 534 (injury due to disease rather than accident); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Galloway (Tex. Com. App. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 973 (plaintiff
only partially incapacitated instead of totally incapacitated).
62. See C. J. Gallagher's criticism of the rule in Texas & P. Ry. v.
Perkins (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 284 S. W. 683, 686, wherein he asserted:
"Doubtless any testimony tending to show that plaintiff's injuries might
have resulted from some other cause was admissible to aid the jury in
determining such issue (referring to the issue presenting plaintiff's affirma-
tive viewpoint) * * * Such testimony in this case, if any, did not, in the
absence of pleading, raise an issue within the meaning of that term in the
authority cited, but was evidentiary only."
63. Toney v. Herman Hale Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 36 S. W.(2d) 234; South Plains Coaches v. Behringer (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 959; Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Martin (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 363. Speer, Special Issues (1932) sec. 150.
64. In Anderson v. Seelow (1937) 224 Wis. 230, 271 N. W. 844, 846,
Fowler, J., said: "The sole purpose of a special verdict is to get the jury to
answer each question according to the evidence, regardless of the effect or
supposed effect of the answer upon the rights of the parties as to recovery.
To inform them of the effect of their answer in this respect is to frustrate
this purpose." See: Beach v. Gehl (1931) 204 Wis. 367, 371, 235 N. W. 778,
780, and Banderob v. Wisconsin Central Ry. (1907) 133 Wis. 249, 287, 113
N. W. 738, approving the above rule. See also Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
McLean (Tex. Com. App. 1926) 280 S. W. 557; Wichita Valley Ry. v.
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under Rule 49 (a), the federal district court apparently was not
concerned over this matter.65 Of course if an ordinary man would
know the legal result of any particular finding, it is not error
for either the court or the counsel so to inform the jury.6
Professor Sunderland has suggested that, since the facts
which the jury is expected to find are the ultimate facts of the
case and the facts which the parties are expected to plead are
the ultimate facts of the case," * * * it would be perfectly easy
to draw the pleadings in such a form as to make them serve
as the special verdict itself."67 Although carefully drawn plead-
ings would materially simplify the process of drawing the issues
to be submitted to the jury, and pre-trial procedure may be
looked to as an aid in this process, it appears that as long as
pleadings are used as a touchstone for litigation, issues must
be framed after the evidence is all in. The price for laxity must
be paid at some point in the procedure; if the pleadings are
loosely drawn, the trial judge and the attorney must work the
harder to present simple and precise issues to the jury. 8
V. EXPLANATION AND INSTRUCTION
The fourth provision of Rule 49 (a) stipulates that "the court
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concern-
ing the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the
jury to make its findings upon each issue." A similar provision
is found in the Texas statute,69 but the statute of Wisconsin and
Southern Casualty Co. (Tex. Com. App. 1926) 284 S. W. 940; McFaddin
v. Hebert (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) 118 Tex. 314, 15 S. W. (2d) 213;
Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines v. Grasso (Tex. Civ. App 1933) 59 S. W.
(2d) 337. When a party complains of this error of the charge suggesting
the legal effect of the answer, he must present more evidence than the
mere fact that the finding of the jury was against him. Guffey Petroleum
Co. v. Dinwiddie (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 182 S. W. 444.
65. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach (D. C. Md. 1939) 25 F.
Supp. 852.
66. McFaddin v. Hebert (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 118 Tex. 314, 15 S. W.(2d) 213; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Harling (Tex. Com. App. 1924) 260
S. W. 1016.
67. See Sunderland, supra note 3, at 263.
68. Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, provides: "In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorney for the parties to appear before it for a conference to
consider (1) the simplification of the issues; * * * (6) such other matters
as may aid in the disposition of the action."
69. Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 2189 provides: ** * such explana-
tions and definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury
to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues."
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the rule of Michigan are silent on this point.7o During the early
stage of the special verdict practice in Wisionsin, it was permis-
sible to present a general charge along with special questions.
This loose practice was, however, condemned by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as a "bad practice," 71 and now the Wisconsin
trial court, in the giving of instructions on special verdicts, is
limited to presentations of the "general rules of law appropriate
to the particular question of the special verdict." 2 Since one of
the principal purposes of the special verdict practice is to relieve
the jury of the difficult task of understanding and applying the
law, the submission of a general charge along with special ques-
tions or with a form verdict is truly a "bad practice."
The chief problem in the Texas practice has been to determine
how far the court may go in giving "such explanations and defi-
nitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury
to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issue."73
Obviously, the only legitimate purpose of any instruction or ex-
planation is to aid the jury in its ultimate function of properly
deciding the issues.74 In view of the difficulty of determining
when it is necessary to give instructions, the Texas courts
have held that, in order to take advantage of an error in this
particular, a timely objection must be preserved.7  Similarly, a
duty rests on the counsel who desires a particular instruction
70. Wis. Stats. (1937) see. 270.27.
71. Byington v. Merrill (1901) 112 Wis. 211, 88 N. W. 26.
72. Banderob v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. (1907) 133 Wis. 249, 113 N. W. 738.
73. See supra, note 69.
74. "In the nature of things, the statute has not attempted to declare
what 'legal terms' shall be explained or defined further than 'shall be
necessary to enable the jury to properly pass on and render a verdict on
such issues.' * * * Ordinary words of simple meaning, of course, need not be
defined. But those terms which in law have a distinct fixed meaning which
an ordinary person would not readily understand should, upon proper re-
quest, be defined." Robertson & Mueller v. Holden (Tex. Com. App. 1928)
1 S. W. (2d) 570; Tidal Western Oil Corp. v. Blair (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
39 S. W. (2d) 1103; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Bridges (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
39 S. W. (2d) 1109; David v. Starnes (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 61 S. W.(2d) 548; Houtchens v. State (Tex. Com. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 1011;
Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 578.
,75. Robertson & Mueller v. Holden (Tex. Com. App. 1928) 1 S. W. (2d)
570, (Commission of Appeals approved by Texas Supreme Court) wherein
is said: "It is thus the rule that, whether the defect in the court's charge
be an affirmative error or mere omission, a proper objection pointing out
the defect is a sufficient predicate for reversal." Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v.
Conely (1924) 113 Tex. 472, 260 S. W. 561; Osceola Oil Co. v. Stewart
Drilling Co. (Tex. Com. App. 1924) 258 S. W. 806; Yellow Cab & Baggage
Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 30 S. W. (2d) 697; Kansas City, M. &
0. Ry. v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 270; Richards v.
Westmoreland (.Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 715.
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to request its submission.76 The tendency of the Texas practice
has been for the court to give instructions whenever in doubt,
and consequently more and more instructions have been given.7?
The necessity of giving instruction on legal standards has
sometimes been avoided by incorporating the standard in the
question asked. For example, instead of defining negligence, the
standard may be presented to the jury thus: "Do you find from
the preponderance of the evidence that John Doe, on the occasion
(describing it) exercised such care and caution, if any, as an
ordinary prudent person would have exercised under the same
or similar circumstances ?".7'  By this method the process of
defining negligence is simplified, and the jury answers the inter-
rogatory without the necessity of referring to instruction on a
legal standard.
In addition to the necessary advisory explanations and defini-
tions of legal terms which have been sanctioned in Texas, the
Texas courts have frequently considered it advisable to give cer-
tain precautionary instructions, warning the jury against the
commission of certain common errors and acts of misconduct.79
In a particular case it may be advisable to admonish the jury
not to consider the legal effect of its answer,80 or not to visit the
scene of the accident, 81 or not to indulge in a quotient verdict,
82
or not to discuss the case with witnesses, or not to consider the
court costs or the amount of the attorney's fees. 3
76. See supra, note 75.
77. Speer, op. cit. supra note 63, see. 51: "The safe rule is, when in
doubt, define."
78. Bailey v. Woodrum Truck Lines (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 36 S. W.(2d) 1090; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 253
S. W. 549; Booth v. Crosby (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 248 S. W. 417; San,
Antonio, U. & G. Ry. v. Dawson (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 201 S. W. 247.
Speer, op. cit. supra note 63, sec. 55: "Clearly when an issue submits the
essentials of a cause of action or defense in terms of its legal meaning
rather than terminology, the necessity for explanations and definitions is
avoided."
79. Reed v. Bates (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 216, 218: "It has
been said many times by our courts that an admonitory charge is not error,
but that such charges are 'salutary in effect'." St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. v.
Allen (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 296 S. W. 950; Houston Belt and T. Ry. v.
Davis (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 77; Speer, op. cit. supra note
63, sees. 143 and 145.
80. Simmonds v. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. (Tex. Con. App. 1930) 29 S. W.
(2d) 989; Speer, op. cit. supra note 63, sec. 145.
81. Southern Traction Co. v. Wilson (Tex. Com. App. 1923) 254 S. W.
1104.
82. See supra, note 75.
83. Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Woodall (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 294
S. W. 873, rev'd on other grounds in (Tex. Com. App. 1927) 299 S. W. 220.
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In submitting a case to the jury under a general charge, it is
necessary to allocate the burden of proof between the litigants."
Under the special verdict practice, however, such an allocation
of the burden of proof is not necessary. The primary purposes
of the special verdict are to emphasize facts, not law, issues, or
litigants, and to remove as much as possible the effect of the
personal elements of influence, bias, or prejudice. For the sake
of these objectives, the charge should not place the burden of per-
suasion upon the plaintiff "to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the affirmative of special issues No. 1 to 18" and the
burden on the "defendant to prove * * * the affirmative of special
issues * * * No. 19 to 33." 85 Although this form of instruction
is clearly objectionable it has been allowed with criticism. The
Texas Supreme Court has insisted, however, that "the proper
practice is to point out to the jury where, and not upon whom the
burden of establishing a preponderance of the evidence lies." 8
Thus it has been suggested that the issue be formed by asking
the question, "Do you find from the preponderance of the evi-
dence that (following with the question to be determined), so
framing the question, upon each issue, as to place the burden of
proof where it properly belongs ?,,1T The first two decisions under
Rule 49 (a) throw no light on this phase of the special issue
practice.""
VI. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL ON OMITTED ISSUES
Probably the most outstanding contribution which has been
made to the efficient and expeditious use of the special verdict
is found in Rule 49 (a), which provides that if in submitting the
issues to the jury
the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or
84. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2485.
85. See Reed v. Bates (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 296 S. W. 950.
86. Boswell v. Pannell (1915) 107 Tex. 433, 180 S. W. 593; Duron v.
Beaumont Iron Works (Tex. Com. App. 1928) 9 S. W. (2d) 1104; Reed v.
Bates (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 296 S. W. 950, supra, holding: "Though this
charge does not constitute reversible error, we think, where the court
charges on the burden of proof in a special issue case, the suggestion made
by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Wootton v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) 286 S. W. 680, 688, should be followed: 'In charging on the burden of
proof in a special issue case, we think the proper practice is to point out to
the jury where, and not upon whom, the burden of establishing a pre-
ponderance of the evidence lies'."
87. Sharp, J., in Federal Surety Co. v. Smith (Tex. Com. App. 1931)
41 S. W. (2d) 210, 214.
88. See cases cited supra, note 49 and infra, note 101.
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by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial byjury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted
without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it
fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment of the special verdict.
Prior to the enactment of the present rules, the federal courts,
in line with the common law precedent, persistently held that,
in order to support a judgment, a special verdict must con-
tain a finding upon every material issue or fact essential to a
judgment. 9 The Supreme Court went so far in Hodges V.
Easton 9 as to hold that even when the facts omitted from the
special verdict were "conceded or not disputed at the trial" the
court could not "consistent with the constitutional right of trial
by jury * * * presume that a jury trial on the omitted findings
had been waived." The Court asserted that "every reasonable
presumption should be indulged against its waiver."
The strict rule pronounced in Hodges v. Easto?e9 represented
the prevailing rule throughout the United States until 1897. In
that year Chief Justice Gaines of the Supreme Court of Texas, in
applying the rule of Hodges v. Easton, asserted as follows:
We take occasion to say that we do not approve the rule.
Logically it is correct; * * *. But the rules of procedure
in the courts should be so framed as to secure substantial
justice, and any oversight of the court or of the counsel,
which, within certain limitations, is not calculated to operate
to the prejudice of the parties and has not so operated,
should be disregarded. * * * Under our system of procedure
in many, if not in most cases, numerous issues arise, and in
such the facts can be best determined by a jury upon a
89. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank
(C. C. A. 5, 1932) 55 F. (2d) 564, 567, Mr. Justice Hutcheson asserted:
"In the absence of an applicable statute such as Texas has, specifically
authorizing such practice, a judgment may not in a case tried without
waiver to a jury be entered in part upon a special verdict which is not
complete, and in part upon findings of the court."
See also: Hodges v. Easton (1883) 106 U. S. 408. In Graham v. Bayne
(U. S. 1855) 18 How. 60, 63, Mr. Justice Grier asserted: "If a special ver-
dict be ambiguous, or imperfect,-if it find but the evidence of facts, and
not the facts themselves, or finds but part of the facts in issue, and is silent
as to others,-it is a mistrial, and the court of error must order a venire
de novo." Ward v. Cochran (1893) 150 U. S. 597; Mounger v. Wells (C. C.
A. 5, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 521; United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Commercial
Nat'l Bank (C. C. A. 5, 1932) 55 F. (2d) 564.
90. Hodges v. Easton (1883) 106 U. S. 408.
91. Ibid.
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submission of special issues; but our reports show that
under the existing rule it is a dangerous practice. The fact
about which there is no controversy is apt to be omitted in
the submission, and verdict, otherwise correct must be set
aside. Probably the Legislature could pass no measure better
calculated to promote a prompt and proper disposition of
causes than to provide that, when a case is submitted upon
special issues, the submission of all issues not requested
by a party to the suit shall, upon appeal, be deemed to have
been waived, and such issue shall be presumed to have been
determined in- such manner as to support the judgment of
the court.92
In response to this worthy dictum, the Texas legislature, which
was then in special session, enacted, in almost the exact form
suggested by Chief Justice Gaines, the folowing statutory pro-
vision:
Failure to submit an issue shall not be deemed a ground
for reversal of the judgment, unless its submission has been
requested in writing by the party complaining of the judg-
ment. Upon appeal or Writ of Error, an issue not submitted
and not requested is deemed as found by the Court in such
manner as to support the judgment if there is evidence to
sustain such finding * * **93
Ten years later the substance of the Texas statute was en-
acted in Wisconsin in a form superior to that of the Texas
statute, in that the Wisconsin statute expressly stipulates that
the omitted fact may be a fact "essential to sustain the judg-
ment."14 In 1931, the substance of the Wisconsin statute was
in turn incorporated in the Court Rules of Michigan.92
It should here be observed that judicial interpretation of the
Texas statute has not served to preserve for Texas the efficient
procedural device conceived by Chief Justice Gaines. In Moore
v. Pierson," the first authoritative interpretation of the Texas
statute, the Texas Supreme Court held that an omitted issue as
to the existence of negligence, an independent ground of defense
in that case, might be presumed to have been found by the court
92. Silliman v. Gano (1897) 90 Tex. 637, 39 S. W. 559, reh'g denied
(1897) 40 S. W. 391 (Italics supplied).
93. Tex. Laws of 1897, Special Sess., c. 7, now incorporated in Tex.
Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 2190.
94. Wis. Laws of 1907, see. 2858m, now incorporated in Wis. Stats.
(1937) sec. 270.28.
95. Mich. Court Rules 1931, 1933, Rule 7, see. 7.
96. (1906) 100 Tex. 113, 94 S. W. 1132.
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as a finding of no negligence-a finding in such a manner as to
sustain the judgment. In the subsequent decision of Ormsby v.
Ratciffe,97 the Texas Supreme Court narrowed its concept of the
issue which might be presumed as having been found by the
court in support of the judgment, to an issue which in connec-
tion with other issues might be considered as supporting a cause
of action or a ground of defense. The court thus repudiated the
previous broad interpretation in Moore v. Pierson" that a "sepa-
rate and independent finding of facts establishing a cause of
action or a defense" might be presumed. Later decisions have
still further narrowed the operative effect of the Texas statute
until it appears now that the Texas courts will not presume a
finding on an ultimate fact issue even though the particular issue
is auxiliary to other issues actually submitted and found. 9 Thus,
through a series of judicial somersaults the Texas practice has
been carried back to the condition lamented by Chief Justice
Gaines in Silliman v. Gano in 1897. As the result of efforts to
eliminate the confusion which has thus developed in the Texas
practice and as a result of the impetus created by the new federal
rules, Texas should have established an effective rule by Sep-
tember, 1941.11
Hinshaw v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.,101 the
97. (1928) 117 Tex. 242, 1 S. W. (2d) 1084.
98. (1906) 100 Tex. 113, 94 S. W. 1132.
99. Dallas Hotel Co. v. Davison (1930) 23 S. W. (2d) 708. The suit was
by a guest of the defendant hotel company for negligent loss of valuables
taken from the guest's room. Special issues were submitted and the jury
found: (1) that certain conditions existed; (2) that such conditions and
acts were the proximate cause of the loss; (3) that no contributory negli-
gence existed; and (4) that the value of the lost articles was of a certain
amount. The case was reversed because there was no special issue finding
upon negligence although there was ample evidence of negligence and the
trial court had thought negligence was apparent as a matter of law. The
decision spoke of negligence as an independent ground of recovery although
negligence had previously been classified as only a part of a cause of action.
The next decision narrowing the Texas concept of what might be presumed
under art. 2190 is Federal Surety Co. v. Smith (Tex. Com. App. 1931) 41
S. W. (2d) 210. In the next important decision, International-Great North-
ern Ry. v. Casey (1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 669, the appellate court refused to
presume that the issue of proximate cause had been found by the trial
court. The court emphasized its decision, the duty of the plaintiff to see
that the essential elements of his cause of action were submitted, asserting
that unless they were submitted they were waived.
100. By statutory authorization, H. B. No. 108, October, 1939, the Texas
Supreme Court is authorized to adopt new rules of Civil Procedure on
September 1, 1941.
101. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 45. The first federal decision on
Rule 49(a) was presented in Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach(D. C. Md. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 852.
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first federal appellate decision to review the waiver provision of
Rule 49 (a), construed the rule as giving the appellate court the
right to presume that an issue which was not submitted or re-
quested had been found by the court in such a manner as to sus-
tain the judgment for the life insurance company. Had this
issue been presented to the jury a different judgment might have
followed. The decision, despite the brevity of its discussion,
demonstrates the practical usefulness of the new rule. The facts
of the case are simple. The plaintiffs, the insurance company
named and another company, brought an action in the district
court for a declaratory judgment against Johanna H. Hinshaw
as administratrix de bonis non with the will annexed of the estate
of Mary E. Voss, deceased, to determine the rights of the parties
under certain annuity contracts. The defendant filed a cross
action alleging wrongful and fraudulent acts in the procuring of
the contracts. The cases of the two insurance companies were
consolidated and submitted to the jury for a special verdict.
Fifteen issues were submitted, and fourteen were found in favor
of a judgment for the plaintiff. The fifteenth question and an-
swer read: "Did W. F. Gentry tell Mary E. Voss that the pre-
mium and reserve on the annuities mentioned in evidence were
based on the annuity table adopted by the insurance companies
in their contract? Answer: Yes." There was evidence indicat-
ing that the premiums and reserve on the annuities were not
based on the annuity table as represented by W. F. Gentry, the
agent who procured the contracts of insurance for the companies,
and that his statement was, therefore, false. A sixteenth ques-
tion might have been propounded to determine whether or not
Mary E. Voss relied upon the representation which, according
to the answer to the fifteenth question, was made by Gentry, but
such a question was not requested. The answer to the fifteenth
question appears to have been immaterial without a sixteenth
one covering the issue of reliance. Since no sixteenth issue was
requested, the trial court upon the basis of the answers to the
first fourteen questions entered judgment for the plaintiffs and
dismissed the defendant's cross-petition.
The defendant sought reversal on appeal because, among other
things, he contended that Miss Voss, the insured, was "presumed
to have relied upon the representation of fact made to her by
Gentry." As previously stated, none of the findings except find-
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ing fifteen showed any fraudulent conduct on the part of Gentry;
and if there was to be a finding on fraud, an additional finding
was necessary. The circuit court of appeals, without passing on
the question of whether a preliminary false statement which
induces an insurance contract may legally constitute fraud, as-
serted that since there was "no request to submit any further
questions to the jury" the defendant waived "a trial by jury of
the issue so omitted."
Although the court made no specific finding on the issue of
possible fraud as presented in the answer to question fifteen,
it held, in accord with the presumption of Rule 49 (a), that the
omitted issue was "deemed to have been made by the court
in accord with the judgment." The judgment was accordingly
affirmed. The interpretation of the rule seems to be in line with
its legal purpose.
In view of the strict interpretation of the constitutional right
to a trial by jury presented in Hodges v. Easton02 and later in
Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,1"3 the constitutionality
of the present rule might be questioned were it not for the fact
that the Supreme Court would scarcely promulgate an unconsti-
tutional rule. Rule 49 (a) in effect imposes a forfeit of the right
to a jury trial on an issue in a case when the proponent fails to
demand its submission. Such provision appears, however, to be
only a reasonable limitation on the right to a jury trial, and, as
such, the soundness of the rule is above question.0 4 The further
stipulation, providing that if the court fails to make a finding
on an omitted issue "it shall be deemed to have made a finding
in accord with the judgment on the special verdict," is a rule of
procedural convenience consistent with practical justice to all
parties concerned.
102. (1882) 106 U. S. 408.
103. (1913) 228 U. S. 364, restricted the courts power under the re-
strictions of the Seventh Amendment to grant a judgment non obstante
verdicto; but the later decision in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Red-
man (1935) 295 U. S. 654, limited the effect of the Slocum decision, and
Rule 50(a) and (b) provides for a reservation of the courts ruling on a
motion for a directed verdict and permits the trial judge under the theory
of a reserved ruling to enter a judgment non obstante verdicto.
104. Coughran v. Bigelow (1896) 164 U. S. 301; Prince Line v. Ameri-
can Paper Exporters (C. C. A. 2, 1932) 55 P. (2d) 1053; Lehigh & N. E.
Ry. v. Finnerty (C. C. A. 3, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 289; In re Baker (C. C. A. 9,
1926) 13 F. (2d) 119; Fenno v. Primrose (C. C. A. 1, 1903) 119 F. 801.
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VII. FORM OF THE VERDICT-ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES
As the method by which issues of fact are presented to the jury
may vary, so the form of the special verdict under Rule 49 (a)
may vary. The special verdict may consist of "categorical or
other brief answer" to each issue, or it may consist of "written
forms of the several special findings," or it may consist of writ-
ten findings in the form deemed "most appropriate" by the court.
The prevailing and probably the most expedient practice is to
have a verdict consisting of brief answers which are responsive
to brief questions propounded to the jury.
As has often been stated by both the state and federal courts,
"a special verdict should not be accompanied by a general ver-
dict."105 Obviously, a verdict "must be either general or special.
It cannot be both.106 To require a general verdict along with
a special verdict is to mar, if not to defeat, the aims and pur-
poses of the special verdict practice. The provision for quizzing
the jury along with the general charge, as set forth in Rule
49(b), is designed to satisfy the demand of those who wish to
blend the two systems of verdicts 07
Obviously the general practice demands that the essential
findings of the jury, required by the court as the basis of its
judgment, shall not conflict with each other. 08 If the essential
controlling findings are in conflict, the jury has failed utterly to
perform its function of determining the facts, and its verdict is
a nullity. In order to sustain a verdict, a practical rule in Texas
directs that all of the findings be given effect if possible.1°9 If,
within the spirit of this rule, the issues are found to be conflict-
ing, the trial judge should refuse to render a judgment and should
declare a mistrial. The judge may, however, before declaring a
mistrial, direct the jury to reconsider its verdict. It should be
observed that the mere presence of inconsistency in the findings
is not necessarily fatal to the verdict, if, as a matter of law, the
105. Francis v. Earle (C. C. D. Conn. 1896) 77 Fed. 712; British Queen
Mining Co. v. Baker Silver Mining Co. (1891) 139 U. S. 222.
106. British Queen Mining Co. v. Baker Silver Mining Co. (1891) 139
U. S. 222.
107. See supra, note 30.
108. Mounger v. Wells (C. C. A. 5, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 521; Waller v.
Liles (1902) 96 Tex. 21, 70 S. W. 17; Stevens v. Novice State Bank (Tex.
Com. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 419.
109. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 58 S. W. (2d)
557; Southwest Bitulithic Co. v. Dickey (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 28 S. W.
(2d) 264.
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findings in their entirety compel a certain judgment, and if dif-
ferent findings to those creating the inconsistency could not,
under any contingency, justify a different result. 1o
VIII. CONCLUSION
The modified special verdict under Rule 49(a) should not be
confused with its common law antecedent nor with the prac-
tice of procuring a general verdict accompanied by answers to
interrogatories as provided by Rule 49 (b). Rule 49 (a) is a new
rule based upon a very old idea. Its potential advantages in a
trial by jury are many. By its use the trial judge is relieved from
the difficult task of charging the jury on the law of the case, and
thus the danger of errors incident to a lengthy charge is elimi-
nated. At the same time the jury's task is simplified. Instead of
attempting to understand the court's charge the jury may devote
its entire efforts to the task of answering definite questions of
fact. The fact that the jury is relieved from the task of resolving
the controversy for one party or the other, eliminates as far
as possible the ever present dangers of a verdict prompted by
sympathy, bias, or prejudice. Under the necessity of answering
definite questions concerning the facts in issue, the jury is con-
strained to answer each question in accordance with the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The individual juryman would be
embarrassed to do otherwise. The very nature of the procedure,
the method of allocating the burden of proof, the placing of em-
phasis on facts rather than on parties, all tend toward the devel-
opment of a scientific and sensible procedure for the jury trial.
By the use of the special verdict both sides of a controversy
may be more efficiently presented to the jury than under the
110. In Perez v. Houston & T. C. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 5 S. W.
(2d) 782, a tort action was brought by a railway section hand. The jury
in response to interrogatories found as follows: (1) that the plaintiff
employee was guilty of contributory negligence, (2) that the employer was
guilty of negligence which was not the cause of the injury, (3) that the
injury was the result of a legal accident. The appellant in the case con-
tended that these finding were in conflict. It is quite apparent that if the in-
jury was the result of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
it could not have been caused by a legal accident. If the inconsistency be-
tween the finding of contributory negligence and the finding of a legal
accident were harmonized by changing the answer to either issue, the
general result must be a verdict for the defendant because the defendant's
negligence was found not to be the cause of the injury. The appellate
court consequently held that the inconsistency between the findings was im-
material and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
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method of presenting alternates in the general charge. Further-
more, if the trial judge misapplies the law to the special verdict
he may correct his error without the necessity of a new trial.
And of outstanding importance is the fact that the definite
factual findings furnish a practical, concrete basis for the appel-
late court's evaluation of the case on review. If the only error
involves a point of law or a misapplication of law to the facts
by the trial judge, the necessity for a new trial should be elimi-
nated. Obviously, the procedure incident to the use of a special
verdict calls for a thorough analysis of a case and exposes the
steps in the legal process to close scrutiny. The errors which may
thus be exposed do not condemn the special verdict-rather they
present mistakes which unless discovered might result in in-
justice.
In the final analysis, it is believed that the fact-finding pro-
cedure of Rule 49(a) provides the nearest approach to a scien-
tific method of trial by jury yet evolved. Nevertheless, experience
with a similar verdict in the courts of Wisconsin and of Texas
shows that the rule is not perfect, that too strict an application
of legal niceties can defeat the efficiency of the rule, and that its
successful operation is dependent upon a close cooperation be-
tween bench and bar. A knowledge of the problems which the
rule involves and a scientific technique for its application will
come not by divination nor unverified assumptions but through
the detailed, intensified analysis of actual experiences with its
workings in different jurisdictions. In the hands of the federal
judiciary the modified special verdict of Rule 49 (a) should give
new life to the jury system.
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